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Human Rights and South-South 
Development Cooperation: Reflections 
on the “Rising Powers” as International 
Development Actors
Emma Mawdsley*
AbSTRACT
The era of Western-dominated international foreign aid, development norms, 
and institutions is far from dead, but it is starting to rupture. Key to this 
is the growing visibility, assertiveness, and impact of a wide range of (re)
emerging donors and development partners. Foreign aid and development 
assistance have long been prime sites in the negotiation and projection of 
human rights internationally, but this has overwhelmingly centered on the 
Western-dominated development community as the driver of dominant 
ideologies, practices, and funding. This article concerns the potential roles 
and impacts of Southern states on human rights in their roles as donors 
and development partners. 
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I. INTRoDUCTIoN
Like many other elements of the global polity, international development 
norms, actors, and institutions are currently in a period of seismic shift. 
One of the principal drivers of change is the increasing visibility, activity, 
and influence of a wide range of (so-called) non-traditional or (re)emerging 
donors and development partners.1 States that have in some cases been 
development actors for decades, but which have been largely ignored by 
mainstream and critical analysts alike, have in the last five to ten years 
become game-changers in international development.2 In addition to the 
large “rising powers”—notably Brazil, China and India—a “second tier” 
of development partners includes Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Chile, and 
others. Beyond these are many smaller and more sporadic donors, some 
of which are themselves ranked as low-income, but which are recorded as 
humanitarian donors in particular.3 Adding to the diversity and proliferation 
of the development community are a number of Gulf States, which initiated 
development cooperation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the ten 
Central and East European states whose accession to the European Union 
in 2004 and 2007 entailed, for most, a return to donor activities.4
Individually and in the aggregate, the increasing visibility and activities 
of these (re)emerging donors and development partners present considerable 
opportunities and profound challenges for poverty reduction, economic 
development, social wellbeing, and environmental sustainability, as well 
  1. The terminology here is a minefield. It is inaccurate to refer to many of these countries 
as “new,” “non-traditional,” or “emerging” donors, and indeed, some reject the term 
“donor” (hence the use of “development partner”). By the same token, the terms traditional 
or mainstream donors also obscure a more complex history, while implicitly centering 
the OECD-DAC donors and multilaterals. The article tries to chart its way through this 
terminological morass as best as possible. For a longer discussion see emma mawDsley, 
From recipients to Donors: emerging powers anD the changing Development lanDscape (2012). 
  2. Marco Vieira, Rising States and Distributive Justice: Reforming International Order in the 
21st Century, 26 global soc’y 311 (2012); Giles Mohan & Marcus Power, New African 
Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement in Africa and the Changing Architecture 
of International Development, 35 rev. aFr. pol. econ. 23 (2008); Soyeun Kim & Simon 
Lightfoot, Does “DAC-Ability” Really Matter? The Emergence of Non-DAC Donors: 
Introduction to Policy Arena, 23 J. int’l Dev. 711 (2011); Development cooperation anD 
emerging powers: new partners or olD patterns (Sachin Chaturvedi, Thomas Fues & Eliza-
beth Sidiropoulos eds., 2012).
  3. Matthias von Hau, James Scott & David Hulme, Beyond the BRICs: Alternative Strate-
gies of Influence in the Global Politics of Development, 24 eur. J. Dev. res. 187, 190 
(2012); Nils-Sjard Schulz, The Third Wave of Development Players, FRIDE Policy Brief 
No. 60, at 2 (2010); Emma Mawdsley, Non-DAC Development Partners and Humani-
tarian Assistance, in hanDbook on humanitarian action (R. MacGinty & J. Peterson eds., 
forthcoming).
  4. Simon Lightfoot, Enlargement and the Challenge of EU Development, 9 persp. eur. politics 
& soc’y 128 (2008); Debra Shushan & Christopher Marcoux, The Rise (and Decline?) of 
Arab Aid: Generosity and Allocation in the Oil Era, 39 worlD Dev. 1969, 1970–1971 
(2011).
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as the formulation and achievement of human rights in development poli-
cies and practices. The era of Western-dominated international aid norms 
and institutions is far from dead, but it is certainly starting to rupture. Homi 
Kharas et al. express the view of many commentators in observing that: 
While the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) [Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development – DAC] remains the core of the global 
aid system, its monopoly of world ODA [Official Development Assistance] is 
eroding with the rise of the so-called new development partners. . . . Traditional 
donors that form the OECD/DAC can no longer claim to speak for the world’s 
donor community.5 
In the international system more broadly, including within the UN and Bret-
ton Woods Institutions, states that were (or were erroneously considered to 
be) recipients of aid alone, are now a more assertive presence in negotiating 
development norms and practices. The recent establishment of the Develop-
ment Cooperation Forum (DCF) under the auspices of ECOSOC is indicative 
of the changing balance of political gravity within the UN and beyond.6 
This article seeks to provide a platform from which to examine the place 
of human rights within the international development cooperation agendas, 
policies, and practices of the Southern “rising powers” (broadly conceived). 
It does not detail the human rights commitments and records of individual 
Southern states in relation to their development cooperation agendas, poli-
cies, and programs; nor does it dwell on the classic and important debates 
concerning human rights in the South. Rather, the article seeks to provide 
a foundation that enables more knowledgeable and rigorous analyses of 
human rights approaches within the rapidly growing realm of South-South 
Development Cooperation (SSDC), and thus within what is a rapidly chang-
ing global development landscape.
This article starts with a very brief note on human rights and foreign 
aid within mainstream development and then turns to SSDC partners. It sets 
out four “interventions” that are key to understanding and assessing how 
SSDC partners engage with human rights in their “donor” roles. These are: 
1) the definition of the South-South Development Cooperation; 2) how virtue 
is framed within the SSDC; 3) the barriers to translating domestic human 
rights achievements to international development cooperation policies and 
programs; and 4) the implications of a stronger (but not exclusive) focus 
on economic growth and productivity. This article concludes by reflecting 
  5. catalyzing Development: a new vision For aiD 38–39 (Homi Kharas, Koji Makino, & Woojin 
Jung eds., 2011).
  6. Development cooperation in a changing global orDer (Hany Besada & Shannon Kindornay 
eds., 2013); T. Fues, Competing Aid Regimes: Will the UN be Able to Challenge the 
Dominant Role of the OECD-DAC in International Development Cooperation (2010) 
(unpublished manuscript, German Development Institute) (on file with author).
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on the implications for the human rights agenda in official development 
cooperation relations, and touches on the trends and directions in global 
development norms and governance. 
Before starting, it should be emphasized that Brazil, China, India, Turkey, 
South Africa, South Korea, and others have different historical trajectories, 
economic and demographic profiles, regional and international agendas, 
identities, and relations. Moreover, they are not, of course, singular agents, 
but comprise multiple and sometimes competing individuals and sub-national 
institutions, and are also subject to contingent and dynamic contexts.7 Clearly, 
this article is pitched at a synoptic level, and while these four points are ac-
curate in broadly capturing aspects of the (re)emerging Southern development 
partners, beyond this, each requires further detailed and specific analysis.
II. “MAINSTREAM” DEvELoPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Debates over the relationship between human rights, international develop-
ment, and foreign aid are long-standing, although to date they have focused 
almost exclusively on the mainstream bilateral and multilateral donors.8 
The relationship between human rights and development has been debated 
since the inception of the Universal Declaration in 1948, but it was in the 
1990s that an explicit rights-based approach (RBA) to development started 
to coalesce in its present form.9 According to Simon Maxwell, this uses the 
international apparatus of human rights norms, codes, and laws to construct 
the “scaffolding” of development principles and practices.10 However, few 
mainstream development actors fully commit to a rights-based development 
approach, even if most articulate the centrality of human rights as an essen-
tial element of development.11 One area of contention concerns the nature 
and sequencing of civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, 
social, and cultural rights on the other, as well as the relationships between 
them. Another particularly acute debate centers on whether human rights 
discourse represents Western rather than universal principles, and whether 
they have been mobilized in ways that discipline non-Western societies 
and states.12 The Responsibility to Protect has proven to be a particularly 
  7. Similarly, DAC bilaterals are in fact a very diverse group of donors. See carol lancaster, 
Foreign aiD: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic politics (2007). 
  8. eric neumayer, the pattern oF aiD giving: the impact oF gooD governance on Development 
assistance 56 (2003)
  9. Shannon Kindornay, James Ron, & Charli Carpenter, Rights-Based Approaches to De-
velopment: Implications for NGOs, 34 hum. rts. Q. 472, 483–85 (2012).
 10 Simon Maxwell, What can we do With a Rights-Based Approach to Development?, 
Overseas Deveopment Institute (ODI) Briefing Paper 99 (1999).
 11. Kindornay, Ron, & Carpenter, supra note 9, at 483–85. 
 12. Makau W. Matua, Savages, Saviors and Victims: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 
harv. int’l l. J. 201, 227–234 (2001).
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polarizing issue in recent years.13 Other analysts have examined how human 
rights discourses have been mobilized from the ground up in progressive 
political struggles in non-Western settings.14 
The relationship specifically concerning foreign aid allocation and hu-
man rights has been studied extensively in relation to the OECD-DAC donors 
and, to a lesser extent, regional organizations and multilateral development 
organizations.15 The literature is rich and varied, but also largely inconclusive; 
the complexity of actors, definitions, and analytical techniques has ensured 
ongoing debate and contested views of the relationships between human 
rights, aid allocation, and aid management and outcomes amongst the (so-
called) traditional donors. Most of these studies focus on first generation 
political and civil rights, more generally expressed as democratic governance, 
which are usually codified and measured according to the index provided 
by Freedom House. A number of authors, however, suggest that personal 
integrity rights—freedom from political violence and violations, such as false 
imprisonment, disappearances, torture, and political murder—constitute a 
better measure of what lies at the very core of the notion of human rights.16 
Eric Neumayer uses the Purdue Political Terror Scales (one derived from Am-
nesty International and the other from the US Department of State’s Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices) to make the case that this offers a more 
meaningful basis for the analysis of foreign aid allocation and human rights 
in most recipient states.17 Amongst other things, the rejection of political 
terror and violence is harder to frame as contingent on a particular form of 
western culture, as is often the case with relativist critiques of the dominant 
construction of political and civil rights.
Neumayer notes that second generation economic and social rights are 
rarely the subjects of analysis within the literature examining foreign aid al-
location. As he observes, governments can be reasonably held accountable 
for civil, political, or personal integrity rights, whereas economic perfor-
mance and social behaviors are harder to attribute entirely to government 
 13. Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq, 19 ethics & int’l aFF. 31 (2005); Alex J. Bellamy, 
The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On, 24 ethics & int’l aFF. 143 (2010).
 14. stones oF hope: how aFrican activists reclaim human rights to challenge global poverty 
(Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011).
 15. See, e.g., Daniel Braaten, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Multilateral 
Development Banks (2012) (Dissertation, University of Nebraska), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1580447; Steven C. Poe & Rangsima Sirirangsi, Human Rights and U.S. 
Economic aid to Africa, 18 int’l interactions: empirical & theoretical res. int’l relations 309 
(1993); Shannon L. Blanton, Impact of Human Rights on US Foreign Policy Assistance to 
Latin America, 19 int’l interactions: empirical & theoretical res. int’l relations 339 (1994).
 16. See, e.g., David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal, 31 am. J. pol. sci. 1002 (1987); Poe & 
Sirirangsi, supra note 15.
 17. neumayer, aiD giving, supra note 8, at 53.
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actions. Weak economic performance can be the result of many external 
and internal factors, and the relationship with foreign aid can be difficult or 
impossible to delineate and extract. This article will return to the question 
of economic rights later.
The literature on the mainstream aid community reveals variations in 
donor engagement with human rights agendas in their development policies 
and programs. Notwithstanding important nuances and complexity, Neu-
mayer’s analysis summarizes the dominant view that the end of the Cold 
War had little aggregate impact on the relationship between human rights 
and the allocation of OECD-DAC bilateral foreign aid (although there is a 
stronger relationship with improved aid allocation and improvements in 
personal integrity rights for both bilateral and multilateral aid). He concludes 
that the results are “somewhat disappointing to the extent that one believes 
that respect for human rights should play a more prominent role in the al-
location of aid.”18 
III. THE (RE-)EMERGING DEvELoPMENT PARTNERS WITHIN THE 
INTERNATIoNAL DEvELoPMENT CoMMUNITY
Recent years have witnessed a surge of analysis and commentary in response 
to the growing visibility, role, and influence of the rising powers as inter-
national development actors.19 The rise of China did much to initiate this 
growing interest within the international development community, and this 
interest has spilled over into a wider appreciation of the rapidly growing 
number and activities of other (re)emerging development partners. At one 
extreme, some commentators take a hostile view of what they consider to 
be the sinister agendas and impacts of rogue donors, such as China, Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. These countries are accused of using toxic 
aid to promote their national self-interest at the expense of poor people 
and countries, while undermining liberal global governance and the hu-
man rights of ordinary people.20 The democratic rising powers—including 
 18. Eric Neumayer, Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral 
and Multilateral Aid Flows, 25 hum. rts. Q. 510, 527 (2003).
 19. See, e.g., Jin Sato, Hiroaki Shiga, Takaaki Kobayashi & Hisahiro Kondoh, How Do “Emerg-
ing” Donors Differ from “Traditional” Donors?An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in 
Cambodia, JICA Research Institute Working Paper 2 (2010); South Centre, Developing 
Country Perspectives on the Role of the Development Cooperation Forum: Building 
Strategic Approaches to Enhancing Multilateral Development Cooperation, Analytical 
Note SC/GGDP/AN/GEG/10 (2008); mawDsley, From recipients to Donors, supra note 1. 
 20. Moisés Naím, Rogue Aid: What’s Wrong with the Foreign aid Programs of China, 
Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia? They are Enormously Generous. And They are Toxic, 
Foreignpolicy.com (2007), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/02/14/
rogue_aid.
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Brazil, India, and South Africa—tend not to be subject to the same levels 
of virulent condemnation, and within the mainstream aid community many 
now—somewhat belatedly—welcome the specific expertise and additional 
resources that these (re)emerging development partners provide. However, 
they also express concerns that the fragile gains made by the traditional 
donor community towards good governance, aid effectiveness, and poverty 
reduction will be undermined, partly by the sheer proliferation of new actors, 
but also by their lower levels of transparency and their different approaches 
to development, including with regard to human rights.21 For others, the 
fracturing of the Western-dominated aid cartel is viewed in a more positive 
light; here, the (re)emerging donors and development partners are expected 
to be instrumental in re-balancing global power, offering recipient nations 
greater choices in their sources of financing and assistance, and demonstrating 
alternative models and approaches to economic growth that may well prove 
more effective in increasing productivity, security, and poverty reduction.22 
Some development partners are recognized innovators and global contribu-
tors to social welfare initiatives (notably Brazil) and peacekeeping (India, 
Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and others),23 while their economic engines are 
driving investment and trade across much of the global South. Most of these 
analysts acknowledge that questions remain about how the full spectrum 
of South-South Development Cooperation activities might impact poverty 
reduction, social justice, gender equality, environmental sustainability, and 
human rights in particular contexts and relationships. 
The Western-dominated international development community has 
matured rapidly in its views of the (re)emerging development partners. In 
the last five years or so the terminology and phrasing has shifted, albeit not 
completely, away from patronizing notions of socializing the rising powers 
as development actors towards an atmosphere of outreach, partnership, 
 21. Penny Davies, Aid Effectiveness and non-DAC Providers of Development Assistance; 
Background Document to Round Table 9 for HLF-3 (2008), available at http://www.ipc-un-
dp.org/publications/southlearning/penny.pdf; Penny Davies, South-South Cooperation: 
Moving Towards a new aid Dynamic, 20 poverty in Focus 11, 12 (2010); Sven Grimm, 
John Humphrey, Erik Lundsgaarde & Sarah-Lea John de Sousa, European Development 
Cooperation to 2020: Challenges by New Actors in International Development (2009) 
(EDC Working Paper. No. 4, German Development Institute), available at http://www.
edc2020.eu/fileadmin/Textdateien/EDC2020_WP4_Webversion.pdf; Richard Manning, 
Will “Emerging Donors” Change the Face of International Cooperation?, 24 Dev. policy 
rev. 371, 377–78 (2006); Felix Zimmermann & Kimberly Smith, More Actors, More 
Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-operation, 23 J. int’l Dev. 722, 
731 (2011). 
 22. Hisahiro Kondoh, Takaaki Kobayashi, Hiroaki Shiga & Jin Sato, Diversity and Transforma-
tion of Aid Patterns in Asia’s “Emerging Donors” (2010) (Working Paper, JICA Research 
Institute).
 23. Grimm et al, supra note 21, at 22–24. 
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and mutual learning. While China in particular still attracts more negative 
comments,24 these ‘non-DAC’ actors are increasingly courted rather than 
ignored, marginalized, or denigrated. However, even within this more posi-
tive environment, there is a widespread view that whatever other challenges 
and opportunities they bring, human rights are not a strong framework for 
action or intended outcome for the (re)emerging development partners, and 
may indeed be positively undermined.
The next section sets out four key interventions, which are proposed as 
essential to approaching how SSDC activities impact human rights and how 
they might influence the way in which human rights are embodied within 
wider international development norms and institutions. 
Iv. THE (RE-)EMERGING DoNoRS/DEvELoPMENT PARTNERS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS
Based on an analysis of their UN voting records, Ted Piccone observes that: 
“Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey are inconsis-
tent advocates for democracy and human rights on the international stage.”25 
There is no question that, for the most part, this observation is more than true 
in the specific realm of South-South development cooperation policies and 
practices. Just like their OECD-DAC counterparts, neither the humanitarian 
nor developmental realms are sequestered from the competing demands of 
other strategic interests, some of which may be at odds with a human rights 
agenda. More particularly, while most of the Southern states note human 
rights from time to time in statements and speeches about development 
cooperation policies and programs, they are not prominently discussed in 
this context and are not held up as key objectives or principles. Human 
rights considerations do not seem to have any bearing on the allocation of 
development cooperation financing or other flows and relationships. The 
limited evidence on allocation, for example, suggests that geo-economic 
interests, regional interests, and historical ties are the dominant factors 
shaping South-South Development Cooperation.26 
However, this article argues the need to finesse this view. Although some 
of the points below might initially seem rather tangential to human rights 
 24. For example, at the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness at Busan, US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton made thinly concealed comments about China, warning recipient 
countries to be “wary of donors who are more interested in extracting your resources 
than building your capacity.” See Andrew Quinn, Clinton Tells Developing World to 
be Wary of Donors, reuters.com, 29 Nov. 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/11/30/us-development-clinton-idUSTRE7AT08J20111130.
 25. Ted Piccone, Do New Democracies Support Democracy?: The Multilateral Dimension, 
22 J. Democ. 139, 151 (2011).
 26. Davies, South-South Cooperation: Moving Towards a new aid Dynamic, supra note 21.
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agendas and debates, together they provide an essential basis for informed 
debate over potential challenges and opportunities that the Southern pow-
ers bring to international development and human rights in more specific 
contexts.
A. Defining South-South Development Cooperation
South-South Development Cooperation is not coterminous with foreign aid, 
or Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), as it is officially called. This 
apparently technical and even innocuous point is central to many of the 
errors that stalk media and even policy debates about the rising powers and 
international development. In some cases, even when this fact is initially 
acknowledged, the discussion, categories, and comparisons return to a tacit 
conflation of aid and development cooperation. Most of the Southern states 
refer to some elements of their development cooperation programs as aid, 
and this category is usually comprised of very similar, but not necessarily 
identical, flows and activities to those categorized as ODA by the OECD-
DAC. These programs include grants, loans, technical assistance, debt relief, 
studentships, and humanitarian assistance.27 Others, such as India, engage 
in these aid and aid-like activities but reject the term altogether, referring 
only to development cooperation (although individual Indian officials and 
commentators will refer to aid on occasions).28 Whether or not the term is 
used, in all cases the concept and practices of SSDC extend beyond aid, 
and within this loose and ambiguous category, aid and aid-like activities are 
frequently purposefully blurred and blended with more commercial loans 
and financial instruments aimed at fostering trade and investment, building 
diplomatic relationships, and enhancing soft power.
These different definitions and the modalities they encompass tend to be 
poorly understood and are repeatedly compared directly with and measured 
against mainstream foreign aid, notably when trying to calculate levels and 
shares of South-South assistance, but also in making political and moral 
judgments about the nature and purpose of SSDC. Deborah Braütigam has 
expertly deconstructed this tendency to conflate aid, trade, and investment 
in relation to China, but this category error is frequently made with regard 
to other Southern partners as well.29 
 27. the reality oF aiD management committee, south-south Development cooperation: a challenge 
to the aiD system? (2010), available at http://www.realityofaid.org/roa_report/south-south-
development-cooperation-a-challenge-to-the-aid-system/.
 28. Id. at 3.
 29. Deborah bräutigam, the Dragon’s giFt: the real story oF china in aFrica (2009). See also 
Bräutigam’s blog, which reveals ongoing examples of poor understanding, reporting and 
analysis of China’s engagements in Africa, available at http://www.chinaafricarealstory.
com/. 
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The implications are significant when it comes to evaluating develop-
ment cooperation and human rights. Corporations—whether private sector 
or state-owned—occupy a different position in relation to human rights 
responsibilities compared to national development agencies and other 
state actors. While corporations should be scrutinized and rigorously held 
accountable by regulators, shareholders, workers, and customers, these ne-
gotiations tend to be governed and managed through the realm of corporate 
social responsibility, national and international legal frameworks, private 
sector confederations, consumer standards agencies, trades unions, and so 
on. States, on the other hand, including subsidiary bodies such as national 
development agencies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs, have sovereign 
primacy and are (theoretically) formally committed to the suite of human 
rights treaties to which they are signatories. Brazilian, Indian, South African, 
and South Korean firms, among others, can and should be held accountable 
by states and non-state actors in the countries where they have operations. 
Indeed, their active enrollment as partners and agents within the SSDC opens 
up potential avenues for promoting stronger consideration of human rights 
obligations in their activities. However, the fact remains that corporations 
are not quite in the same position as state bodies in relation to international 
treaty obligations. 
Compared to most OECD-DAC donors, state-owned and private enter-
prises tend to make up a higher share of the channels and actors in the SSDC, 
while dedicated aid personnel working in national development agencies 
tend to make up a smaller share and have less direct managerial responsibil-
ity and influence (as do civil society actors). This disparity has implications 
for the rising powers in terms of how they will formally enroll and pursue 
human rights considerations in their policies and decisions regarding allo-
cation and management. Among other things, the prevalence of enterprise 
suggests that an increasingly important arena for human rights issues that 
must and should be addressed is that of labor conditions, consumer rights, 
and the environmental and social responsibilities of firms. 
b. Effective but not Ethical? Alternative Constructions of “virtue” Within 
SSDC
Tacit assumptions about what constitutes virtuous foreign aid are rife within 
the mainstream international development community. While many Southern 
states are now increasingly recognized as effective and desirable develop-
ment partners by the mainstream community, they are generally viewed as 
demonstrating somewhat inferior ethics of aid. They appear overwhelmingly 
motivated by mere self-interest rather than enlightened self-interest.30 The 
 30. stephen chan, the morality oF china in aFrica: the miDDle kingDom anD the Dark continent, 
at ix (2013).
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positive outcomes of Southern States’ development cooperation activities 
for recipients can, under this reading, be understood as fundamentally 
secondary effects of their geo-economic strategic interests: they are primar-
ily instrumental rather than ethical in nature. However, this is a culturally 
parochial misreading of the range of what might constitute different claims 
(if not necessarily realities) of virtue in development relationships.31 This 
misreading has implications for where human rights are located within the 
official development cooperation perspectives and strategies of the Southern 
partners. 
The discourse of South-South Development Cooperation is critically 
anchored in a number of historical lineages, notably the Non-Aligned 
Movement, various socialist solidarities, and attempts to foster stronger Third 
World diplomatic alliances and platforms within the UN while promoting 
South-South economic integration. At official events and in speeches, pub-
lications, and communiqués, SSDC is repeatedly and consistently framed 
around the following claims: 
•	 The	assertion	of	a	shared	experience	of	colonial	exploitation,	post-colonial	
inequality,	and	present	vulnerability	to	uneven	neoliberal	globalization,	and	
thus	a	shared	identity	with	poorer	nations;	
•	 Based	on	this	shared	experience,	a	specific	expertise	in	appropriate	devel-
opment	approaches	and	technologies;	
•	 An	explicit	 rejection	of	hierarchical	 relations	and	a	 strong	articulation	of	
the	principles	of	respect,	sovereignty,	and	non-interference;	and	
•	 An	insistence	on	win-win	outcomes	of	South-South	foreign	aid	and	mutual	
opportunity.	
Even though political and economic realities of the globe and individual 
countries has shifted substantially from the 1950s to the new millennium, the 
language of SSDC reflects an earlier set of ideological claims and geopoliti-
cal positions. Susan Bayly, for example, has produced a detailed historical 
ethnography of Vietnam’s development cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the profoundly different situation within which capitalist 
Vietnam currently seeks to build its international relations, she writes: 
I have been struck by the adoption of an idiom of socialist neo-tradition in 
official representations of Vietnam’s present-day pursuit of overseas trade and 
investment opportunities. What has been said since the early 2000s in official 
media accounts of these initiatives is that Vietnam’s quest for export markets in 
a host of “liberalising” African economies is not a pursuit of narrow economic 
gain or “interest.” . . . On the contrary, say the ministries’ media spokesmen, 
these efforts are wholly consistent with the country’s heritage as a socialist 
 31. Id. at 84–85.
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provider and maker of “traditional friendships” . . . through the imparting of 
aid and tutelage to the continent’s “needy” postcolonies.32 
This framing of past relations and current shared interests in this way differs 
markedly from the dominant construction of foreign aid in the West. Even 
though OECD-DAC politicians and policy-makers publicly state that national 
self-interest is a motivation for aid (for example, in terms of security), the 
wider public continues to overwhelmingly understand aid as charity to the 
less fortunate, whether or not it approves of such expenditure.33 Indeed, Dane 
Rowlands observes that even among development professionals, “Despite 
the consistent evidence that [Western] aid allocation tends to be dominated 
by . . . political and strategic interests . . . there remains within the develop-
ment community as a whole a sense that the true objective and motivation 
of development assistance is the moral one of assisting the less fortunate.”34
The relationship between cultural constructions of giving and the real-
politik of foreign aid is complex. While investigations into underlying ethical 
frameworks of both western and Southern international aid and development 
cooperation do provide vital insights, they certainly do not reveal simple 
explanations of motivations or behaviors.35 But it is nonetheless vital to 
recognize a strong sense of a particular form of virtue that animates SSDC, 
even while allowing for a more complex realpolitik.36
Most Southern donors and development partners resist the donor-recipi-
ent terminology, and some even that of foreign aid, tarnished as these terms 
are by dominant Western and DAC associations. The Brazilian government 
talks in terms of horizontal cooperation, while South Africa articulates its 
role as “contributing to the African Renaissance,” describing itself as an 
organic part of the greater whole to which it gives, but from which in turn 
it can expect benefits.37 Mutual opportunity and reciprocity are the themes 
 32. susan bayly, asian voices in a postcolonial age: vietnam, inDia anD beyonD 226–27 (2007). 
 33. mawDsley, From recipients to Donors, supra note 1.
 34. Dane rowlanDs, emerging Donors in international Development assistance: a synthesis report 
5 (2008).
 35. Andrew Hurrell, Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be 
Great Powers, 82 int’l aFF. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
 36. For a sophisticated set of discussions on the continuities and changes in “moral” claims 
within the foreign policy of different large Southern states, and tensions with realist agen-
das and interests, see Charalampos Efstathopoulos, Reinterpreting India’s Rise Through 
the Middle Power Prism, 19 asian J. pol. sci. 74 (2011); Philip S. Golub, From the New 
International Economic Order to the G20: How the “Global South” is Restructuring World 
Capitalism From Within, 34 thirD worlD Q. 1000 (2013); Fabiano Mielniczuk, BRICS 
in the Contemporary World: Changing Identities, Converging Interests, 34 thirD worlD 
Q. 1075 (2013); Philip Nel & Ian Taylor, Bugger Thy Neighbour? IBSA and South-South 
Solidarity, 34 thirD worlD Q. 1091 (2013).
 37. Wolfe Braude, Pearl Thandrayan & Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, The South Africa Case: Emerg-
ing Donors in International Development Assistance (2008) (Report 3, South African 
Institute of International Affairs); Lídia Cabral & Julia Weinstock, Brazil: An Emerging 
Aid Player (2010) (Briefing Paper 64, Overseas Development Institute (ODI)). 
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that openly emerge in this language. India, for example, couches develop-
ment cooperation in terms of the benefits it brings to itself as well as to its 
partners/recipients; it draws attention not just to what it gives, but to what 
it gets in return.38 Senegal, Zambia, Ghana, and Mozambique, for example, 
are not just the objects of charity or humanitarian compassion, but places 
that can redeem their honor and status by providing resources, investment 
opportunities, and markets. The rhetoric of solidarity is given expression in 
the ritualized performances that surround events like the India-Africa Sum-
mit (launched in 2008), as well as bilateral high-level meetings and delega-
tions. The red carpet is literally rolled out and every effort made to enact 
and convey respect while underlining the dignity and sovereign presence 
of the partner nations. 
Perhaps the most celebrated—and criticized—expression of this stated 
commitment to sovereign respect in this particular arena, is that SSDC is 
characteristically not accompanied by policy conditionalities.39 In other 
words, Southern partners apparently reject the practice of imposing changes 
with policy and governance structures, one of the most contentious aspects 
of mainstream international development over the last thirty years, given their 
role in driving and deepening neoliberal economic polities and economies 
across Eastern Europe and the “Third World.”40 Many commentators reason-
ably express concerns that this unwillingness to insist on policy and gover-
nance conditionalities will undermine efforts to reduce corruption, achieve 
poverty reduction, and promote human rights. In some cases it is taken as 
evidence that the donors in question have little or no commitment to inclusive 
“development,” but to the pursuit of their own interests: securing investment 
opportunities, opening access to markets, capturing resource flows, and 
soaping diplomatic solidarities with political elites.41 China is often the key 
target of such criticisms. Its riposte, like that of other providers of SSDC, 
is located within its historic commitment to foreign policy principles that 
were enshrined in declarations at the Bandung Conference of 1955, notably 
respect for sovereignty. Western aid conditionalities repeatedly breach that 
sovereignty—insisting that states adjust currency rates, drop tariff barriers, 
privatize, deregulate, re-write tax codes, and so on. China and most other 
 38. South Centre, supra note 19, at 53.
 39. Carina Kiala, The Impact of China Africa Aid Relations: The Case of Angola (2010) (Policy 
Brief No. 1, African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi), available at http://www.
africaportal.org/dspace/articles/impact-china-africa-aid-relations-case-angola.
 40. the new conDitionality: the politics oF poverty reDuction strategies (Jeremy Gould ed., 
2005); giles mohan, eD brown, & alFreD b. milwarD, structural aDJustment: practices, theory 
anD impacts (2000); anDrew molD, policy ownership anD aiD conDitionality in the light oF 
the Financial crisis: a critical review (2009), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
fr/development/policy-ownership-and-aid-conditionality-in-the-light-of-the-financial-
crisis_9789264075528-.en;jsessionid=pmgkttf6dsc.delta.
 41. Naím, supra note 20.
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Southern donors have been highly critical of this interference in the past, 
and the assertion that they respect the sovereignty of their partner countries 
is claimed to be a central principle of their development cooperation poli-
tics and conduct. Of course, while this provides an attractive implicit and 
explicit critique of the problematic dimensions of western interference in 
developing countries, it is also consistent with an unwillingness to respond 
to criticism of domestic and international human rights violations.
Are the Southern development partners right to assert respect for sover-
eignty, or are their protestations of conditionality reflective of their willingness 
to secure resources and markets with no concern for wider development 
impacts? There can be no singular response to this, but it should be noted 
that policy and media critiques are often levied at inappropriate targets. Soft 
commercial loans and export credits are often labeled aid and then dispar-
aged for not conforming to international standards of ODA. This mis-targeting 
is a serious and widespread weakness within a surprisingly large number 
of commentaries. Just as Western firms would not be expected to demand 
policy conditionalities, neither should Indian or Brazilian commercial actors. 
To return to alternative constructions of virtue, SSDC framings of solidar-
ity, empathy, and mutual benefits should not be seen as simply a veneer for 
more strategic interests—notwithstanding the demonstrable pursuit of such 
strategic interests in many situations. The Southern states, amongst others, 
frame contemporary development assistance as a continuance of what 
Philippe Nel calls “the unfinished struggle against disrespect and humilia-
tion.”42 Drawing on constructivist international relations theory, Nel argues 
that the rising powers are presently seeking not just redistribution of global 
wealth and power (e.g. at the UN Security Council), but also recognition. 
The hierarchical languages and assumptions embedded in mainstream de-
velopment over most of the post-1945 era are emblematic of decades of 
such humiliation—indeed, it is remarkable to what extent patronizing and 
parochial languages and assumptions persist within both official and routine 
development discourse.43 While there have been previous attempts to build 
Third World platforms and joint demands, such as the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, the economic and political muscle 
that the leading rising powers now command has changed. The reality of 
SSDC certainly departs from these principles at times, and there is no ques-
tion that this discourse projects a sanitized and highly selective account of 
 42. Philip Nel, Redistribution and Recognition: What Emerging Regional Powers Want, 36 
rev. int’l stuD. 951 (2010). See also chris alDen, sally morphet & marco antonio vieira, 
the south in worlD politics (2010); Eduard Jordaan, South Africa, Multilateralism and 
the Global Politics of Development, 24 eur. J. Dev. res. 283 (2012).
 43. maria eriksson baaz, the paternalism oF partnership: a postcolonial reaDing oF iDentity in 
Development aiD (2005). 
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interests, agendas, and impacts; it will not necessarily help the interests of 
poorer people or poorer countries.44 But SSDC is construed through a moral 
lens: one that has a real and deep grasp for many proponents of SSDC, in 
spite of contradictions and tensions in practice.45
What are the implications for the role of human rights within South-South 
Development Cooperation? This particular framing foregrounds a principle 
of justice among states. Sovereign respect, (supposed) non-interference, and 
the claim to be a part of and working for the developing country community 
are all expressions of this principle, something that is clearly appreciated by 
many within recipient countries.46 It constitutes an entirely defensible chal-
lenge to a dispensation of global power that is manifestly unjust, reflecting 
colonial and post-war power relations. However, this SSDC focus on justice 
among states risks serious and problematic inattention to justice within 
states, notably in terms of individual human rights. Assertions of win–win 
outcomes are too often founded on a simplistic construction of the “national 
interest” of both partners, obscuring the contested and dislocating nature of 
development. Building roads, developing raw materials, and modernizing 
agriculture will bring benefits to many, but it also usually brings costs—par-
ticularly to indigenous peoples, small farmers, forest-reliant people, and the 
poor. The uneven social and economic consequences of such modernization 
and economic growth are often glossed over beneath a symbolic regime 
of striving nations seeking to contest inequalities and injustices within the 
international hierarchy of states. The contested sub-national politics of devel-
opment are concealed in this account of win–win relations and Third World 
solidarity.47 When India talks about “respect for sovereignty,” there is little 
acknowledgement that sovereign power may be contested from below, and 
that it by no means necessarily translates into an empowering relationship 
between a nation-state and its citizens. 
The politics of economic growth, poverty reduction, and development—
within and between Southern partners—are obscured within some of these 
ebullient South-South forums and confident statements of solidarity. SSDC 
has a very meaningful claim to virtue in principle, and it certainly has con-
 44. Golub, supra note 36; viJay prashaD, the Darker nations: a people’s history oF the thirD 
worlD (2008).
 45. Western development professionals are often more than aware of the slippages between 
strategic interests and altruistic motivations, but it would similarly be a mistake to sim-
ply dismiss the dominant discourse of charity and/or enlightened self-interest as purely 
meaningless, or only hypocritical. 
 46. Paul Kagame, Why Africa Welcomes the Chinese, the guarDian, 2 Nov. 2009, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/nov/02/aid-trade-rwanda-china-west.
 47. prashaD, supra note 44; rick rowDen, grain & economics research FounDation, inDia’s role 
in the new global FarmlanD grab: an examination oF the role oF the inDian government anD 
inDian companies engageD in overseas agricultural lanD acQuisitions in Developing countries 
(2011), available at http://re.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/Rick_Rowden.pdf. 
2014 Human Rights and South-South Development Cooperation 645
siderable positive impacts in many ways. However, not only does SSDC tend 
not to cohere with a rights-based development agenda or explicit concerns 
with human rights more generally, but in some regards the focus on state-
state relations actively undermines attempts to promote human rights in and 
through development. It should be said that Brazil is a partial exception 
here, being notable for more strongly addressing social development issues 
and the distributional impacts of economic growth. Brazil’s own experi-
ences and policy decisions regarding poverty alleviation, including support 
for small family farms (and not just agri-business), have translated into its 
development cooperation policies and funding in a comparatively substantial 
way—although this in part may have been influenced by domestic factors.
C. Domestic and International Development Politics
The Southern development donors and partners have mixed domestic records 
with regard to human rights. To what extent may struggles to promote hu-
man rights within the national polity shape their international development 
cooperation policies and programs? Might foreign affairs and development 
cooperation administrations and leaders internalize human rights principles 
and ideals being negotiated within the domestic sphere? Are domestic civil 
society organizations and ordinary publics monitoring and demanding that 
their development cooperation be conducted in ways that recognize, value, 
and even enhance human rights? Piccone offers a cautiously optimistic 
view with regard to the place of the emerging democratic powers within 
the multilateral community more broadly:
[D]omestic advocacy groups are building international networks and learning 
how to pressure their governments to alter their behavior at the International 
level. Social media and the 24-hour news cycle are also contributing factors. 
As democracy deepens in these countries, and as regional and international 
organizations grow in importance, we are likely to see more public debate on 
these issues and, ultimately, greater country-level scrutiny and intervention in 
support of universal norms of human rights and democracy.48
There is some evidence of these trends. The Brazilian organization Conectas, 
for example, has a human rights mission domestically but also abroad, as it 
seeks to strengthen regional and international protection of human rights by 
making Global South countries, particularly Brazil and other new emerging 
powers, accountable for their foreign policies’ decisions that affect human 
rights. It also aims at promoting the use of the UN and regional human 
rights systems by NGOs from Africa, Asia and Latin America, in order to 
 48. Piccone, supra note 25, at 151.
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contribute to the effectiveness of these mechanisms to achieve real impact 
of the ground.49 There are also stirrings of action within the transnational 
development NGO sector. Some of the larger Indian NGOs, for example, 
are keen to more closely observe and take part in India’s development co-
operation role in Afghanistan.50 Among sections of the public, awareness is 
growing of their countries’ public roles as donors and development partners, 
not just as recipients.51 Stuenkel notes that: 
Until recently, foreign policy has been a topic discussed only among Brazil’s 
elites. Yet, due to Lula’s more politicized foreign policy, international issues are 
increasingly visible in the domestic political debate, and there is a growing 
consciousness about Brazil’s role in the world among Brazil’s middle class.52 
Similarly, Engstrom observes that:
As Brazilian foreign policy has democratized—with increasing civil society 
input—and as Brazil has emerged as a pivotal player in global governance, the 
engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy has 
increased. This shift has created the necessary policy conditions for a more ac-
tive Brazilian role in the international human rights regimes on the one hand, 
and a more prominent role for human rights in Brazilian foreign policy more 
generally, on the other.53
The trend may then be positive. However, to date the picture of South-South 
Development Cooperation is not particularly encouraging. First, some govern-
ments are cautious about revealing figures and details of their development 
cooperation programs given the potential backlash against overseas spend-
ing when domestic levels of poverty are high. This appears to be the case 
in South Africa, for example.54 This can inhibit wider public awareness and 
 49. Conectas Human Rights, Foreign Policy and Human Rights, conectas.org, available at 
http://www.conectas.org/en/foreign-policy.
 50. pria & research anD inFormation system For Developing countries (ris), inDia’s global 
Development presence anD engagement oF inDian civil society 2 (2013), available at http://
www.pria.org/index.php/projects/past-projects/item/download/1041_df82c4be7c5a-
64da2597dcf4d2a6579e; see also Supriya Roychoudhury, India’s External Aid: Lessons 
and Opportunities, 48 econ. & pol. wkly. 22 (2013). 
 51. Emma Mawdsley, The Changing Development Landscape of Foreign Aid and Develop-
ment Cooperation: Public Perceptions in India: Introduction (2011), available at http://
www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/foreignaidperceptions/. 
 52. Oliver Stuenkel, Responding to Global Development: Views from Brazil and India 8 
(2010) (Discussion Paper 11/2010, German Development Institute).
 53. Par Engstrom, Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and Continuity under 
Dilma, 38 critical sociology 835, 837 (2012).
 54. J. Kruger, An African Donor: Towards Understanding South African Aid Allocation 
(2010) (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Institute of Development Policy and Manage-
ment, University of Antwerp) (on file with University of Antwerp); Helen Yanacopolos, 
The Emerging Powers and the Changing Landscape of Foreign Aid and Development 
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(Summary Paper 5—South Africa, The Open University), available at http://www.geog.
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debate, while limited transparency can present difficulties for civil society 
organizations (CSOs) seeking to monitor development cooperation. Second, 
domestic audiences and actors may feel that national concerns are simply 
too large and pressing to justify making room for external engagements; 
transnational action may be novel, intimidating, or too resource-demanding. 
In India’s case, there is also a notable reluctance to wash dirty linen in front 
of the global public; in other foreign policy contexts, India’s otherwise vo-
cal and lively CSO sector has shown itself to be reluctant to criticize the 
nation abroad,55 although there are now signs of growing CSO awareness 
and engagement.56 Third, the middle class is the most likely section of the 
public to concern itself with international development policy. This has 
different implications in different places. In the case of India, many elites 
and members of the middle class demonstrate forceful support for India’s 
growing global status. The rhetoric of win-win economic growth appeals 
to both their commercial and patriotic interests, while poverty reduction at 
home and abroad is not always a key concern.57 
The domestic factors that support the greater realization of a human 
rights agenda within individual Southern states include electoral pressures, 
the media, the judiciary, and civil society organizations. Of course, these 
institutions are often flawed, and there continue to be major human rights 
shortcomings and even abuses in these states. However, each state also 
has successes to its name—the Right to Information and Right to Food Bills 
in India, sexuality rights in South Africa, and so on. However, thus far the 
domestic drivers of such achievements appear to be of limited value in pro-
moting a stronger human rights agenda in international development policies. 
D. Stronger Focus on Growth and Productivity
Throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium, many DAC donors 
and multilateral organizations started to place growing emphasis on social 
programs, decentralization, empowerment, and partnership in pursuit of 
democratic governance. In 2008, the World Bank reported that of sector-
 55. mukunD govinD raJan, global environmental politics: inDia anD the north-south politics oF 
global environmental issues (1997); Susie E. Fisher, Networks for Climate Change: Non-State 
and Sub-National Actors in Indian Climate Politics and Governance (2012) (Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge) (on file with Cambridge University Library).
 56. PRIA-RIS, supra note 50, at 11.
 57. Emma Mawdsley & Supriya Roychoudhury, Civil Society Organisations and Indian Devel-
opment Assistance: Emerging Roles for Commentators, Collaborators and Critics?, in inDia’s 
soFt power: the emerging Dynamics oF inDian Development cooperation (Sachin Chaturvedi & 
Anthea Mulakala eds., 2015 forthcoming); Daya Kishan Thussu, A Million Media Now! 
The Rise of India on the Global Scene, 101 the rounD table: the commonwealth J. int’l 
aFF. 435–446 (2012). 
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allocable ODA to low-income countries, the share of social sectors rose from 
27 percent in the early 1990s to an average of 41 percent between 2001 
and 2014. At the same time, the combined share of ODA directed towards 
infrastructure and production dropped from 53 percent to 34 percent.58 Japan 
continues to direct a larger share of its ODA towards physical infrastructure, 
including transport and storage, communications, and energy, but it is an 
outlier in DAC. Since the 1990s, Japan has come under pressure to focus 
more on poverty and soft aid.59 In some respects, this trend can be seen 
as a progressive one, which responded to the criticism that growth did not 
always trickle down to improve the lives of the majority or reduce poverty.60 
However, more critical commentators observe a deepening penetration of 
neoliberal governmentalities,61 while a different critique emerges from those 
who argue that the mainstream development community has come to neglect 
the underlying foundations of productivity and economic growth.62
In contrast, the (re)emerging donors/development partners have tended 
to focus more strongly (although by no means exclusively) on the directly 
productive sectors of the economy, often through specific project funding 
and technical cooperation, as well as through broader trade and invest-
ment activities.63 This includes the building of connective infrastructure 
like road and rail networks; energy infrastructure including dams, power 
plants, refineries, and electricity transmission networks; and investment in 
manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. There are a number of reasons for 
this strong emphasis on economic productivity. Development partners and 
donors are able to benefit more directly and immediately from infrastructure 
and economic investment. Domestic firms in the donor country (private and 
state-owned) can be contracted to supply technical expertise, materials, and 
even labor. Hisahiro Kondoh et al., point out that for most South-South part-
ners the construction sector has a particularly high comparative advantage 
in cost-performance and suggest that, “it is thus logical that these donors 
regard infrastructure construction as their priority.”64 Beyond these direct 
benefits, many (re)emerging development partners have a strong interest 
 58. worlD bank, aiD architecture: an overview oF the main trenDs in oFFicial Development assistance 
Flows 10 (2008), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/IDA15_Replenishment/
Aidarchitecture.pdf. 
 59. DaviD arase, Japan’s Foreign aiD: olD continuities anD new perspectives (2005).
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Critique of Neoliberalism, 16 thirD worlD Q. 297, 299 (2010). 
 61. the new conDitionality, supra note 40, at 7.
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in promoting regional integration and communication, partnerships, joint 
ventures, and economic dynamism. Some of this is oriented towards promot-
ing trade, investment, resource extraction, and market penetration. In other 
cases, there are additional security and stability motivations. Thailand, for 
example, has evident interests in mitigating the marked poverty of its close 
neighbors, which include Burma, Cambodia, and Laos.65 By encouraging 
stronger economic growth in these countries, Thailand hopes to lessen the 
risks of disease pandemics, political instability, and large-scale migration.
Interestingly, it appears that the international development community, 
while by no means completely discarding the previous aid effectiveness 
paradigm, may move in the direction of the (re)emerging donors and develop-
ment partners. Francesco Rampa and Sanoussi Bilal suggest that increasing 
pressures of commercial and national interest are pointing towards a turn 
away from “aid effectiveness” and towards a “development effectiveness 
paradigm.”66 There is no exact agreement on what this means, other than a 
renewed focus on economic growth, enhancing industrial productivity, wealth 
creation rather than poverty reduction per se, greater integration between 
foreign aid and other policy areas (such as trade, investment and migra-
tion), and a growing and more visible role for the private sector. Nils-Sjard 
Schulz talks about a “post-aid” world,67 and many development agencies 
and organizations are scrambling to respond to what may well be the next 
paradigm shift within mainstream development theories and practices. As 
noted above, the (re)emerging donors and development partners tend to 
interweave trade and investment with concessional financing, technical as-
sistance, and other forms of aid. This model seems to be attractive to many 
recipients/partners. In contrast to earlier criticisms, many OECD-DAC donors 
now appear to be evaluating this approach to development cooperation 
more positively. The key challenge of the next decade may be to harness 
the developmental benefits of this approach without inviting a race to the 
bottom by competing national interests, which could sacrifice wellbeing, 
environmental sustainability, and social and political justice.
How might this trend impact human rights? There is a case to be made 
that Southern development partners are helping drive significant economic 
growth across many poorer countries, enhancing economic rights for millions 
of people. However, the overall impacts on political and civil rights appear to 
be neutral at best and undermining at worst. Such concerns were evident at 
the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. Leading up to and 
 65. Id. at 25.
 66. Francesco Rampa & Sanoussi Bilal, Emerging Economies in Africa and the Development 
Effectiveness Debate, ECDPM Discussion Paper 8 (2011); Emma Mawdsley, Laura Savage, 
& Sung-Mi Kim, A “Post-Aid World”? Paradigm Shift in Foreign aid and Development 
Cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum, 27 geographical J. 27, 30 (2014).
 67. Schulz, supra note 3, at 4.
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during the meeting, many civil society organization representatives sought 
to project development effectiveness as a rights-based agenda. Better Aid, 
for example, argued that a new development cooperation system should be 
built upon a focus “on human rights, recognizing the centrality of poverty 
reduction, gender equality, social justice, decent work and environmental 
sustainability.”68 Richard Ssewakiryanga, a Ugandan CSO activist, asserted 
that: “For civil society, [development effectiveness] is a concept that goes 
beyond efficient disbursement procedures (which is what aid effectiveness 
is) to focus on ensuring that human rights are at the core of the way in 
which aid is delivered.”69
However, this rights-based interpretation did not reflect the dominant 
tone of the meeting, or how other, more powerful actors were construing 
development effectiveness. Tensions mounted between civil society actors 
and two other groups in particular: Southern donors and the private sector. 
Chinese delegates openly questioned the universal validity of the claim 
that democratic ownership, human rights, and citizen empowerment are 
necessary to achieve [economic] development. Civil society participants in 
turn expressed concerns that SSDC could be elitist and less accountable. 
Participants were also concerned that these factors might dilute democratic 
principles in the future aid architecture. Ssewakiryanga, for example, went 
on to say:
This call for adopting a rights-based approach to aid delivery will certainly be 
a touchy issue, especially because the new emerging donors have little to show 
in terms of linking up their rapid economic development with the protection of 
human rights. Indeed, as we go forward, the place of human rights in the aid 
discourse remains contested.70
Ssewakiryanga correctly expects resistance; the rights-based projection 
of development effectiveness represented a minority view at Busan, and one 
that is likely to be overwhelmed by the more dominant growth-centered 
construction that appears to be emerging amongst many DAC and non-DAC 
states alike. 
Even allowing for the turbulence of the global financial crisis, for many 
in the South the current period compares favorably to the IMF and World 
Bank-led decades of structural adjustment and the immiseration, austerity, 
and stagnation that followed. The Southern rising powers have some right to 
assert their role in improved economic rights for many.71 However, with some 
 68. better aiD, csos on the roaD to busan: key messages anD proposals (2011), available at 
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2014 Human Rights and South-South Development Cooperation 651
exceptions, there appears to be very little acknowledgement or discussion 
of the distributional issues and implications of such growth. The winners 
and losers in the processes of industrialization and resource extraction are 
very rarely even noted. The human rights of poorer peoples, and notably 
marginalized communities like peasants, small farmers and fisher folk, pas-
toralists, and workers in the formal and informal sectors, are rarely actively 
supported within this growth-led strategy and construction of development. 
In some cases they are actively undermined. 
v. CoNCLUSIoNS
This article has argued that human rights tend to be only weakly, indirectly, 
and residually incorporated into South-South Development Cooperation poli-
cies and programs. There are exceptions, but for the most part human rights 
are not explicitly pursued, notwithstanding claims in various speeches and 
declarations. Reasons for this include the nature and modalities of SSDC, its 
anchoring within the historical principles of non-interference and respect for 
sovereign decision-making associated with long-standing Third World poli-
tics, the limitations of domestic scrutiny of their development cooperation 
policies and programs, and the inclination towards supporting growth and 
productivity rather than good governance, democracy, and social programs. 
Through their development cooperation efforts, the rising powers are 
helping promote the economic rights of millions of people in lower and 
middle income countries, which stimulates jobs, investment, and growth—
although there are questions about whether or not they are driving a more 
structural change in global inequalities.72 Most are also engaged to some 
extent in social welfare programs,73 and in some cases are providing inno-
vative and successful approaches to poverty reduction, peacekeeping, and 
other development goals. However, for the most part these social welfare 
programs are residual to the wider growth agenda. Economic justice within 
states is not on the agenda, while civil and political rights are certainly not 
highlighted or prioritized as goals of SSDC. 
Global development norms, governance, institutions, and financing are 
currently in a state of flux and tremendous uncertainty. The future of the 
human rights agenda within international development looks even more 
vulnerable than was previously the case. However, as this article has at-
tempted to show, the reasons for this are rather more complicated than a 
 72. Nel & Taylor, supra note 36, at 1107.
 73. Haroon Borat & Aalia Cassim, South Africa’s Welfare Success Story II: Poverty-Reducing 
Social Grants, Brookings, brookings.eDu (2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/01/27-south-africa-welfare-poverty-bhorat.
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simple headline story about the self-interest of the [so-called] “new” donors 
and development partners and their lack of interest in human rights. A better 
understanding of SSDC is essential to negotiate and advance a more credible 
and legitimate human rights agenda within any new development paradigm 
that might emerge in the next few years and beyond. 
